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This article analyses the issues of EU ener-
gy policy in the 1990s-the beginning of the 
2000s in order to identify the features of en-
ergy supply and energy safety of the Baltic re-
gion countries. The research and practical 
significance of the work lies in the stepwise 
description of actions taken by EU leaders 
and EU member states in order to formulate a 
common European energy policy. The 2004 
EU enlargement posed the problem of taking 
into account the features of energy supply of 
Eastern European countries and, especially, 
the Baltic States. The energy industries of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as 
other Eastern European and CIS countries, 
are closely related to the energy industry of 
the Russian Federation. Trying to allow for 
this circumstance, EU leaders and energy 
structures took a number of organisational 
measures aimed, on the one hand, at an in-
crease in energy independence of new mem-
bers of the EU and, on the other hand, at tak-
ing into account the recent trends in the en-
ergy market development. The research shows 
that most of the initiatives do not take into 
account the perspective and interests of Rus-
sia, which has a strong presence in the energy 
market. 
The analysis conducted will help the as-
sessment of prospects of further development 
of the Baltic States' energy industry and its in-
teraction with that of the Russian Federation. 
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Despite the fact that the energy prob-
lem is of crucial importance to the EU, it 
was long considered a prerogative of na-
tion states. The community did not have a 
unified energy strategy. In the 1990s, the 
energy policy started to be considered as 
a factor of sustainable development of the 
European Union. Its formulation was faci-
litated by a number of documents, which 
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took into account the interests of Western European countries. First of all, 
one should mention the 1991 adoption of the European Energy Charter 
(EEC) — a system of international agreements relating to energy markets. 
The EEC presupposed free access of the European countries to Russian re-
sources and pipelines, whereas it remained closed for the Russian energy in-
vestment. 
Gradually, the European energy market players tried to escape the regio-
nal European framework giving the EEC an international character. It was 
renamed the Energy charter. 1994 saw the formulation of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, which came into force in 1998.1 
At the same time, experts emphasize that, at the turn of the 20th century, 
the formation and implementation of the EU long term energy policy was 
influenced by a number of problems. Firstly, it is fiscal issues, particularly 
those relating to the internalisation of negative externalities in order to create 
equal conditions for the development and application of different energy 
sources. Secondly, market problems accompanied by calls for thorough and 
detailed monitoring of market processes, the extension of long-term planning 
practices in the private sector, and the creation of mechanisms adjusting the 
market situation. Thirdly, it is the technological issues, including those of 
commercialisation of environmentally friendly but initially unprofitable 
technologies [2]. 
Back then, it seemed that these problems can be solved through the for-
mulation and implementation of a relevant energy strategy. As European 
politicians and energy experts believe, an instrument such implementation 
requires is the so called Green Paper (subheading: A European strategy for 
sustainable, competitive and secure energy) [3]. 
However, the central idea of the strategy presented in the Green Paper 
was that the EU has rather limited opportunities in the field of energy sup-
ply, first of all, as a result of insufficient resources or their low competitive-
ness in the modern world (coal, for instance). Thus, the EU was forced to 
pay special attention to the management of demand for energy carriers. At 
the same time, the generation of this demand resulted in a new energy situa-
tion and new problems. 
First of all, throughout the first decade of the 21st century, the EU could 
not accomplish the liberalisation of energy markets, nor create internal mar-
kets. A clear and rather low diversification of import was established in Eu-
rope: three countries accounted for almost a half of gas supply. An important 
factor affecting the demand for energy carriers was a significant, almost two-
fold, increase in gas prices. And high prices have a tendency to remain at 
that level. 
                                                     
1 Russia signed the charter and partially applied it — on a temporary basis before the 
ratification of the document. However, the Charter was never ratified. The Charter 
was believed to contradict the interests of the RF, since it grants European compa-
nies access to Russian resources, but limits the opportunities of Russian power, oil, 
and gas companies to penetrate the European market; on August 6, 2009, Russia fi-
nally refused the EEC membership due to the disagreement over energy efficiency 
issues and corresponding environmental aspects (see [1]).  
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The most peculiar process of the European energy market development 
is trade in natural gas. Specialists emphasize that, just several decades ago, 
this fuel accounted for a smaller share in the European energy compared to 
coal and oil. However, gradually its technical and economic advantages — 
high calorific value, easy burn control, high equipment efficiency, absence 
of cinder, etc. — became evident, thus, it rapidly rose to the leading position 
in the world balance of fossil fuel consumption. 
The EU had to turn to legislative activity regulating the functioning of 
the European gas market, which resulted in the formulation of the first EU 
gas directive — the underlying document of the liberalisation of EU energy 
markets; on June 26, 2003, the second directive aimed at the accomplish-
ment of liberalisation process and the opening of markets until July 1, 2007 
was adopted (it came into force on July 1, 2004). The opening of EU natio-
nal gas markets granted consumers a free choice of a supplier. The second 
directive also included the measures relating to the separation of transport 
infrastructure of vertically integrated companies into individual legal bodies 
and giving them certain independence from parent companies. 
However, the implementation of the second directive was suspended due 
to the insufficient competition in gas markets. Then, on September 19, 2007, 
the European Commission offered the market players either complete un-
bundling of energy companies or an introduction of independent operators of 
gas transporting infrastructure. These provisions became the key elements of 
the so called “third package”. The EC measures aimed at the change of ow-
nership most negatively affected the transit regime and the rights of foreign 
investors. 
The “third package” initiatives were opposed by a number of leading EU 
countries (France, Germany): they believed the distribution of assets of the 
largest national energy monopolies to be inefficient and undesirable. Moreo-
ver, the initiatives of the “third package” were announced, while the re-
quirements of the second directive were still being pursued. A certain over-
lapping of requirements took place: against the background of an insufficient 
international transport infrastructure, the actions of regulators and operators 
of gas transporting networks were not harmonized; the development of re-
gional markets fell short of the desired. All this gave rise to a logical ques-
tion about the relevance of further, more radical steps towards the market li-
beralisation. In view of the fact that the markets of EU member states were 
at different stages of development, complications in reaching an agreement 
between the parties were becoming clear. Naturally, the leading European 
states proposed a way out (the so called “third way” put forward by France 
and Germany, which aspired to take into account the features of national ener-
gy markets). Russia faced most difficult problems relating to the implemen-
tation of the third energy package in Europe, especially, the Baltics. 
Finally, there emerged a need for the search for compromise decisions in 
the RF-EU framework. Russia was one of the most important gas suppliers 
to the EU countries (according to some estimates, Russian accounts for more 
than a quarter of the total volume of natural gas imported to the EU coun-
tries) [4]). 
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These features of the generation of demand for energy carriers in the EU 
significantly affect its energy security. Energy security, in accordance with 
the third directive, is estimated on the basis of a number of parameters such 
as the dependency on the network operator, the degree of dependence of the 
EU and EU members on import from third countries, the regime of national 
and foreign trade and investment into the energy industry by a certain third 
country. Energy security was traditionally assessed in each case in the con-
text of the factual situation in view of international trade liabilities, in parti-
cular those stipulated by international agreements concluded by the EU with 
third countries. The third country operators, in their turn, must hold certifi-
cation from EU member states and the EU Commission [5]. 
At the same time, energy security of gas importing countries can be en-
sured through encouraging the sustainable use of energy and application of 
its alternative sources (internal factors), as well as the reduction of depen-
dence on importing energy carriers from one source. Taking into account 
that Russia accounts for up to 40 % of gas import to the EU, the latter crite-
rion should be classed as external factors (Gazprom), can pose an obstacle to 
the company’s action on the EU market. 
Different European regions, independent of their EU membership are of 
vital interest for the EU in terms of politics, economy, and security. Natura-
lly, Brussels pursues those interests through different strategic initiatives and 
programmes, such as new Mediterranean policy or the neighbourhood stra-
tegy, etc. 
In January 2009, the Committee on Industry, Research, and Energy of 
the European Parliament approved a draft recommendation on the EU ener-
gy policy in the context of the recent gas crisis. This draft document, as 
Anne Laperrouze mentioned in her report, was drawn up on the basis of the 
Second Strategic Energy Review of the European Commission. Alongside 
the conceptual problems of the energy future of Europe, members of the Eu-
ropean Parliament emphasised the importance of further development of nu-
clear energy, which should be used at the highest technological security lev-
el, as well as the opportunities for the revision of the 2004 EU directive on 
the security of natural gas supply aimed at pursuing a common energy sup-
ply policy and solving other problems. Of special importance were the Baltic 
and Caspian regions, which were identified by the members of the European 
parliament as areas in need of further integration and called for the develop-
ment of gas supply through Central and South-Eastern Europe along the 
North-South axis. The inclusion of the Baltic states into the orbit of a dif-
ferent form Russian gas network was based predominantly on the develop-
ment of the Nabucco pipeline. However, some members of the European 
parliament did not agree with the way the problem was formulated and de-
manded that negotiations on new cooperation and partnership with Russia be 
resumed [6]. 
As the further developments in Central Asia, Asia Minor and Transcau-
casia showed, the idea of using Nabucco is far from reality [7]. The pipeline, 
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whose major problem is filling its capacity, is meant for supplying gas to the 
countries of Southern and Central Europe. The hopes of supplying “Sou-
thern” gas to the Baltics were of political rather than economic nature. One 
cannot exclude that this is why the European Commission — whose actions 
fit in general the framework of the Second Strategic Energy Review — initi-
ated on June 10, 2009 a Strategy for the development of the Baltic region, 
which unlike other strategies is aimed only at the EU member-states. The 
creators of the Strategy pay attention to the fact that many problems of the 
Baltic region can be solved only in the conditions of effective cooperation 
with external partners in the region, in particular, Russia [8]. However, they 
emphasize that this Strategy cannot serve as a guideline for the third coun-
tries; it rather identifies the areas where cooperation is desirable and propo-
ses holding forums where cooperation will be discussed [8]. 
The independence of the EU initiatives in the Baltic was stressed by the 
member of the European Commission, Danuta Hübner, when presenting the 
document: “The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region is a major step as it 
marks a new way of working together in the Union. It does not imply new 
laws or institutions but is rather based on the will of governments and citi-
zens in the Member States and regions to meet urgent, shared challenges. 
The Commission is proposing a comprehensive action plan, based on a tho-
rough consultation with national and regional governments, business, NGOs 
and academia: the EU is well placed to coordinate the work that needs to be 
done in order to make the most of available resources to save the Baltic Sea, 
boost trade and improve the quality of life of everyone in the region” [8]. 
In the framework of the strategy proposed, nine countries (Denmark, Es-
tonia, Finland, Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Sweden, Poland, and Norway) 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the Baltic Energy Market Inter-
connection Plan. A common energy market shall be created in 2009—2015 
[9]. As experts stress, the Strategy for the Baltic Sea region is indeed a large 
project, or as it is often called, Action Plan covering 15 priority areas, within 
which 80 different projects will be implemented. The estimated cost of these 
projects has also been announced — the Baltic region was supposed to re-
ceive more than 50 bln euros investment from different EU funds (including 
27 bln Euro for providing better access to the region and almost 10 bln for 
environmental protection, 6.78 bln for increasing competitiveness, and 697 
mln Euro for ensuring security and risk prevention). The basic point of the 
Strategy is that eight EU countries constituting the Baltic region — Den-
mark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Sweden — 
home to almost 100 mln people — will be able to plan their activities and 
identify priorities knowing that their neighbours contribute both efforts and 
funds to the development of the region [10]. 
One cannot but notice that the Strategy does not take into account the in-
terests of another member of the Baltic region — Russia, whose position in 
the region is quite influential and, in some cases, the implementation of pro-
jects planned is impossible without its participation. In particular, experts 
emphasize that the ecological state of the Baltic Sea is constantly deteriora-
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ting as a result of an excessive discharge of nitrates and phosphates, and its 
biological diversity is threatened. The level of these threats can be lowered 
only through joint efforts. In its turn, Russia (also in order to avoid excessive 
tank load on the Baltic routes) constructed the first stage of the pipeline on 
the seafloor. However, it will yield minimum results because of the aspira-
tion of a number of Baltic States to build liquefied gas terminals, which will 
lead to the use of additional large-capacity vessels. Finally, without taking 
into account Russian interests, there will be significant complications to the 
implementation of energy supply programmes. 
The developers of the Strategy classed such actions under “improving 
the access to, and the efficiency and security of the energy markets” [11]. 
Their estimation of the situation, especially from the EU perspective, is far 
from positive. According to European experts, energy markets (electricity, 
gas, oil) in the Baltic Sea region lack an infrastructure; moreover, they are 
overly focused on the internal needs of the countries and are poorly con-
nected and coordinated. In some EU member states, the openness of markets 
and the competition level are insufficient for encouraging investment. This 
results in a high risk of rise in prices and a threat to energy security. In par-
ticular, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are insufficiently integrated into larger 
energy networks of the European Union2, hence, these countries turn out to 
be sort of isolated when it comes to energy. 
The implementation of the developed energy strategy in the Baltic re-
gion, according to its creators, will face significant complications due to the 
fragmentation of power markets, poor access to generating capacities in the 
region relating to differences in power standards. Emphasizing the on-going 
almost 15-year campaign for the liberalisation of energy market and the re-
sulting lack of competition, they identify as major problems a rise in energy 
prices, a limited number of incentives and opportunities for investment in the 
infrastructure, especially in the field of renewable energy resources. The ab-
sence of cooperation between the three Baltic States is most pronounced in 
the gas sphere. The “sore spot” is the lack of gas links to the other countries 
of the region, which, in its turn, results in the insufficient transborder trade 
turnover, low market liquidity, and rising prices against a decrease in the 
level of energy source diversification. 
The development of an energy strategy is based on all EU/EEA member 
states of the Baltic region being part of the internal electric power and gas 
market. Since, in the early 2000s, the energy markets were at different stages 
of liberalisation and their infrastructures had significant flaws, the physical 
integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia lacked a near-term outlook 
against the background of the planned closing of the major power source — 
the Ignalina NPP. 
Experts emphasized that the diversification can be increased, for exam-
ple, through renewable energy sources, but this way is long and cost-inten-
                                                     
2 The only energy link is the Estlink cable set between Estonia and Finland; ho-
wever, it has a low capacity (see [12]).  
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sive, thus the use of fossil fuels seems to be inevitable. So, the regional inte-
gration of energy systems is an absolute necessity. 
The main conclusion of the strategy developed was a proposal to create 
an integrated and functioning energy market. The formation of a common 
EU energy market should result from the implementation of the Baltic Ener-
gy Market Interconnection Plan — BEMIP. A common energy market 
should be established in 2009—2015 [9]. 
BEMIP will naturally affect the generation and consumption of energy 
by the Baltic region states having different sources of energy supply. First of 
all, it is the countries lying on the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea (Finland, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), which almost completely depend on the im-
port of natural gas form Russia, although they have a small (for Russian 
suppliers) energy market. It is the countries of the southern coast (Germany, 
Poland), which are less dependent on Russian supply, although they are 
more attractive for Russian producers from the export perspective, as well as 
the countries of the western part of the region (Denmark, Sweden, and Nor-
way), which do not depend on Russian energy at all. 
The model of the Baltic states energy market is based on the Nordic 
model and is aimed at ensuring the power exchange so that power between 
the two regions, market management of overloading, and the creation of 
common reserves and energy market balance become possible. 
Moreover, a number of infrastructure projects, which are of significant 
importance from the perspective of market integration and identification of 
potentially reliable companies, have been developed. These are NordBalt 
connecting Sweden and Lithuania, Estlink 2 between Estonia and Finland, 
and LitPol between Poland and Lithuania. Together they shape the so called 
“Baltic energy ring”. Some of the proposed BEMIP infrastructure projects 
were chosen to be financed through the European economic recovery plan. 
The BEIMP plan does not include the Kaliningrad region of the Russian 
Federation, since Russia is a member of neither the EU, nor the European 
Economic Area. 
A number of the plan’s provisions have undergone significant changes 
over the recent two-three years, especially, in terms of the implementation 
periods. The background reasons were the world economic crisis, the rela-
tions between EU member states, the changes in the general situation on the 
world energy markets, etc. In particular, in spring 2011, Lithuanian energy 
experts started discussing the launch of Visaginas NPP in 2020 instead of the 
earlier scheduled 2018 (or even earlier announced 2016). 
One should emphasize that BEIMP has a similar project package for the 
provision of gas supply to the Baltic region. However, most gas projects 
concern the provision of Russian raw materials; however, a significant part 
of project initiatives has not been agreed on by the Russian party, therefore, 
they remain “virtual”. Moreover, the third energy project, which signifi-
cantly complicated the relations between the Russian suppliers and Baltic 
consumers of natural gas, came to force in 2011. 
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As to the pipeline and network, the countries of the southern and western 
coasts of the Baltic Sea seem to enjoy the most favourable conditions; hence, 
the study of their participation in the common European energy market con-
stitutes an individual research task. 
Therefore, the problem of formation of a common Baltic energy market 
in the eastern sector of the region remains unsolved. The Baltics, which as-
pire to become energy independent states, try to solve it individually. The 
Baltic unity, which was characteristic of the region in the 1980s—1990s, be-
came a matter of the past. However, the individual opportunities of these 
countries are rather limited, whereas the EU cannot provide practical help 
due to certain objective reasons (the repercussions of the world crisis, the 
events in North Africa, etc.). Turning to Russia for help seems to be a logical 
necessity. However, it seems to be unlikely in the near future. 
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